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Virtuality and Resistance: Situating the Manifesto Between 
Command and Political Metamorphosis 
  
Matthew Applegate 
Department of Comparative Literature, Binghamton University 
This article surveys and identifies contemporary theories of the 
manifesto genre’s use and place in radical politics. Following the work 
of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, this article argues that the manifesto comes to be thought as a 
mode of spatial and temporal reconfiguration focused in the present, 
rather than as a program prophesying or determining the future of 
resistance. Indicative of a metamorphosis in the interplay between 
state power, capitalist sovereignty and those who resist it, this article’s 
primary claim is that the manifesto is not doomed to obsolescence in 
the face of new revolutionary forms, but comes to function as a virtual 
topography of resistance. In our contemporary moment the manifesto 
comes to be theorized and comes to function as a site where multiple 
spaces and times of resistance are mobilized against state power and 
capitalist sovereignty while its tactical imperatives come to be 
articulated absent of a programmatic determination of their use.  
  
What I explore in this paper is the relationship shared between space, 
temporality, and virtuality as it comes to bear on a particular genre of 
revolutionary expression: the manifesto. My argument is in opposition 
to thinkers like Naomi Klein who have asserted the virtual power of 
the internet and social media to be the end of the manifesto genre; a 
claim that in our contemporary moment follows a line of argument in 
which the obsolescence of the manifesto is thought to be a result of 
extant revolutionary potential in virtual outlets like Twitter or 
Facebook1. Here, I argue in favor of a metamorphosis where the 
border lands 11:3  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
genre is concerned and where revolutionary expression is evolving. I 
am interested in thinking a politics of the manifesto that exceeds its 
own instrumentality. Indeed, I think the manifesto is not only indicative 
of an evolution in radical politics, but a primary site of its 
reconfiguration. Consequently, the manifesto is treated here as a 
provocation toward thinking the shape and character of a fundamental 
shift in the operation and organization of radical politics.  
Contemporary scholarship on the manifesto spans both disciplinary 
and political spectrums; its history and use has been documented and 
analyzed in literary, art historical, and philosophical fields, and its 
potential for future political organization has been theorized in both 
leftist and conservative heritages. But alongside the widespread use 
of new media in recent popular movements against state power and 
capitalist sovereignty, the manifesto’s place in revolutionary 
organization and action takes on a new role. Here, I argue that the 
radical potential of the manifesto is actively theorized in our 
contemporary moment through its virtual capacities—specifically, as a 
mode of spatio-temporal reconfiguration focused in the present, rather 
than as a program prophesying or determining the future of 
resistance. To make a claim to the manifesto’s so-called virtual 
characteristics and capacities is to ground my argument in a 
speculative mode of inquiry. It means reviewing, surveying, and 
developing a critical potential inherent to the genre, but one that is 
perhaps not immediately identifiable. To this end, I offer theoretical 
variations on the genre itself and look to a series of manifestos that 
challenge its generic determination. 
The virtual is deployed here in a Deleuzian sense—I am intent on 
considering the manifesto’s extant potential or inherent power for 
rethinking political possibility. What this focus demands is thus a 
means of parsing out the relation between political writing and action, 
or, the impact of manifesto’s generic determinations in political 
discourse. Indeed, this is precisely the problematic through which 
theorizing the manifesto’s virtual capacities appears. Therefore, the 
trajectory of this paper presents two, interrelated problems at its 
outset. First, what specifically is the manifesto’s relation to political 
action? Second, on what basis can the genre be ascribed virtual 
capacity or potential? In its most traditional theorizations, the 
manifesto is a form of political writing that calls forth a subject of 
resistance and provides a path for its realization. The genre is, in the 
very circumstances of its production, a mode of political articulation 
and orientation. Virtuality, or what I am calling the manifesto’s virtual 
capacities, refers specifically to the avenues of potential that 
undergird its political orientation and articulation. In this sense, the 
politics of the genre are not a question of left or right, but posed as 
processes of reinventing and re-framing our present spatio-temporal 
distributions, and even further, the content of our subjective 
determinations. 
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In a discussion of Vladimir Lenin’s ‘On Slogans’, Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari explore this kind of inherent potential explicitly, claiming 
that political writing and action share a relation that is at once 
grounded in the real, but also prefigurative of our individual and 
collective relations. Deleuze and Guattari make this link explicit in A 
Thousand Plateaus in the connection they draw between ‘order-
words’, or ‘the relation of every word or every statement to implicit 
presuppositions, in other words, to speech acts that are, and can only 
be, accomplished in the statement,’ and incorporeal transformations, 
or, the speculative, transformational attributes that order-words 
express (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 79). So the relation between 
political writing and action can be thought here as the potential for 
what is immanent to language to manifest through, but also outside of 
or beyond, the conditions of its enunciation. 'On Slogans’ is a 
particularly pointed example of this process because it enacts the very 
methods and procedures that are attributed to the manifesto while at 
the same time troubling its modes of articulation. Here, Deleuze and 
Guattari explain that the inherent power of Lenin’s ‘On Slogans’ is 
manifested in the conditions whereby it ‘constituted an incorporeal 
transformation that extracted from the masses a proletarian class as 
an assemblage of enunciation before the conditions were present for 
the proletariat to exist as a body’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 83). It 
is the text, then, that calls forth and establishes the material conditions 
for the proletariat to appear as a collective assemblage prior to its 
formation. The incorporeal transformation that Deleuze and Guattari 
name in this example is not simply the formation of a political subject 
from the masses, it names an instance in which the virtual or inherent 
power of a text effectuates something real. 
The import of this paper rests on questioning by what means the 
manifesto distributes this kind of virtual conversion—what spatio-
temporalizations does it enact and what incorporeal transformations 
might be attributed to the genre itself? By way of a brief and 
somewhat simplified characterization of the genre, then, my argument 
stands in opposition to, or beyond, two primary attributes thought to 
be characteristic of the genre. In the course of this paper, I propose to 
consider the function of the manifesto against an ought or intent to 
command revolutionary struggle that would name its future and 
provide the political program to manifest it. Relatedly, I move to 
problematize the bi-partisan, ‘us’ vs. ‘them,’ ‘friend vs. enemy’ relation 
that is so often asserted where the manifesto names a revolutionary 
telos. For it is precisely a question of how the manifesto articulates 
and orients political action that is of concern here. Indeed, it is 
precisely in theorizing virtuality that the genre’s theorization, use, and 
operation potentially shift. 
Following from these claims, this paper is divided into four parts. First, 
I survey and review popular arguments concerned with the 
historiography and political function of the manifesto genre as such. 
Here, the manifesto’s use and function in political discourse is parsed 
out; however, in a more substantive move, I work to identify several 
limitations imposed on the genre by its strictly historiographical 
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theorization. Janet Lyon and Martin Puchner, two contemporary 
theorists of the manifesto genre, are my primary interlocutors here. 
Out of this examination, I shift my point of analysis to account for the 
concepts and practices that modify contemporary political articulation 
and thus political organization. The manifesto genre is situated at the 
center of these debates. In this second section, I give a first indication 
of what a contemporary political manifesto might look like in a 
discussion of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire. Third, I turn 
to arguments posed by Gilles Deleuze in his 1969 Logic of Sense in 
order to more clearly and rigorously theorize the manifesto’s virtual 
transformations and spatio-temporalizations. Here, I argue that 
demands on contemporary political struggle produce a situation in 
which the manifesto’s modes of representation and spatio-temporal 
interventions are reinvented. However, the genre’s reinvention is not 
positioned toward the reformation of the party, the formation of a new 
political program, or a novel position of command on and over political 
action. Rather, it is anti-programmatic—the manifesto is a site of 
possible encounters that demands action, but refuses to command its 
ultimate shape. Finally, in giving an account of anarcho-communist 
collective Tiqqun’s This is Not a Program, I offer an example of what a 
contemporary manifesto could be and a commentary on the continued 
viability of the genre in political action. 
Manifesto, Manual, Map 
What I cite above as two problems where the genre is considered is 
well documented, albeit rarely challenged or problematized, in the 
work of two contemporary literary and cultural theorists, Janet Lyon 
and Martin Puchner. In her Manifestoes: Provocations of the Modern, 
Lyon identifies the manifesto’s programmatic function, writing: 
The manifesto occupies a distinct generic space in the arena of 
public discourse, and thereby aspires to a concrete form of cultural 
work even if it only rarely performs that work. More specifically, the 
manifesto provides a foothold in a culture’s dominant ideology by 
creating generic speaking positions; the nascent audience 
interpellated by ‘we’ is then held together as a provisional 
constituency through a linguistic contract. The potential audience of 
this contractual ‘we’ occupies the position of either supporting or 
rejecting the manifesto as a representative text. (Lyon 1999, p. 24) 
Later, she emphasizes the manifesto’s seemingly inherent prophetic 
function as well as its bipartisan figuration of the political—the 
formation of a ‘we’ or an ‘us’ against ‘them’—writing that ‘the 
manifesto’s revolutionary speaking position constructs political 
certainty, in other words, not just by reinforcing polemical fields, but 
also by assuming control of the language of history, the conditions of 
the plot’ (Lyon 1999, p. 60). On this reading, the manifesto’s primary 
purpose is to carve out a speaking position within the domain of public 
discourse so as to unify and manifest a constituency heretofore 
excluded by a particular state or culture’s dominant ideologies. Stated 
another way, Lyon understands the manifesto to participate in a 
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discourse of universal equality that circumscribes its political 
interventions. Her theorization of the genre understands marginalized 
or oppressed groups to utilize the manifesto as a means of gaining 
social recognition and parity within a putatively democratic culture. 
Any threat of an anti-statist movement, an alter-national movement, 
etc., that would disavow or work to dissolve a culture’s dominant 
ideology altogether results from an individual or group’s inability to 
receive his, her, or its demands. On Lyon’s interpretation, the 
manifesto is, in the first instance, a reformist enterprise, rather than a 
more radical attempt at living and thinking in total opposition to state 
power and capitalist sovereignty.  
In at least two arguments featured in his Poetry of the Revolution: 
Marx, Manifestos, and the Avant-Gardes, Martin Puchner 
recapitulates an argument in favor of the manifesto’s seemingly 
inherent programmatic and prophetic functions, arguing that the 
politics of the genre establish a revolutionary historiography that it 
subsequently works to manifest. Described as an internal mechanism 
of the genre, Puchner claims that the manifesto ‘projects a scenario 
for which it must then seek to be the first realization’ (Puchner 2006, 
p. 29). As the genre came to take on a concrete form in the twentieth 
century, Puchner argues that this mode of projection, inherent to the 
genre, became synonymous with a universal program for attaining 
political power: ‘Even if many of the projects outlined in manifestos 
were never realized, what became firmly established was the act of 
declaring a new departure, of setting one ism against the next, and of 
laying claim to the future at the expense of the past. What succeeded, 
in other words, was the revolutionary historiography dictated by the 
form of the manifesto’ (Puchner 2006, pp. 70-1). Departing only 
slightly from Lyon, Puchner claims that the manifesto not only 
commands the language of history, it necessarily organizes revolution 
as a narrative of supersession and supplantation. The manifesto 
concretizes a revolutionary historiography by opposing former political 
forms toward the inception of the new.  
The means and the politics by which the manifesto charts socio-
political terrains is constitutive of its intervention, easily given over to 
either statist or minoritarian ideologies. Both Lyon and Puchner 
acknowledge this, ultimately favoring to theorize and focus on the 
moments wherein the manifesto affirms and concretizes a universal 
political operation and language. With this theorization of the genre, 
however, specific limitations on its use and operation are imposed and 
reinforced. Where Lyon understands the manifesto to construct 
political certainty, assuming control over the language of history and 
polarizing political fields, the genre is thought to operate solely as a 
program for attaining liberation and political power. On Puchner’s 
argument, the genre cannot organize revolutionary struggle outside of 
a dialectical bind that both linearizes political struggle and reinforces a 
bipartisan model for political thought and action.  
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By way of a brief example, the features of the genre theorized above 
are identified in and generalized from Marx and Engels Communist 
Manifesto. Indeed, it is Lyon and Puchner’s featured example. In its 
preface, we are witness to The Communist Manifesto’s global 
aspirations:  
It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the 
whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and 
meet this nursery tale of the specter of communism with a 
manifesto of the party itself. To this end, Communists of various 
nationalities have assembled in London and sketched the following 
Manifesto, to be published in English, French, German, Italian, 
Flemish and Danish languages. (Marx & Engels 2008, p. 2) 
Here, Marx definitively takes command over the language of history, 
certainly, the languages of the industrialized world, and attempts to 
unify the working class under a communist party platform. In the first 
chapter, partisan relations are oriented between and by two opposing 
classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This fundamental 
bipartisanship gives shape to the manifesto’s global movement. For, 
where the first cause of the manifesto is derived from the claim that 
‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles,’ the liberation of the working class is thought to manifest in 
the unification of the proletariat and its violent confrontation with the 
bourgeoisie: ‘working men of all countries, unite’ (Marx & Engels 
2008, p. 3, 39)!  
As both Lyon and Puchner take Marx and Engel’s Communist 
Manifesto to be the paradigmatic example of the manifesto in radical 
politics, what remains constant in the manifesto’s revolutionary 
historiography is the place of the political. Here, the manifesto is 
theorized as a practice of positing a revolutionary future and 
establishing the ground for its eventual fruition. In this way, the 
manifesto operates as a manual for attaining political power; the 
genre is either utilized as a step-by-step guide for creating and 
maintaining statist and nationalist political projects or inciting 
revolution and attaining state-like power. Indeed, these two uses of 
the genre are not far removed from each other. It is the tension 
produced by these two operations of the genre, however, that I am 
here intent on exploring: the simultaneous acts of mapping a socio-
political field and the impetus to intervene upon it, coordinate it, and 
manage it. This is to say, the political and philosophical issues that 
arise as a result of both Lyon and Puchner’s arguments above 
concern the way in which the manifesto both marks off a territory—
maps a socio-political field so as to intervene on its cartography—and 
redirects its composition. 
A Virtual Topography 
Two little known arguments, but nonetheless interesting and helpful 
with an eye toward this project from Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
recently published dialogue, Towards a New Manifesto, and Hardt 
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and Negri’s Empire, initiate an alternative theorization of the manifesto 
genre, divergent from Lyon and Puchner’s arguments above. Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s project is to theorize the political conditions for a 
new communist manifesto, a communist manifesto for the twentieth 
century. Acknowledging that political landscapes have changed 
significantly over the hundred years or so since the publication of 
Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto, they imagine the work and 
politics of a new manifesto to be something quite different. Rather 
than assert a globalized political platform, define the terms of a 
necessary antagonism for revolutionary fruition, or work to interpellate 
disparate populations into a unitary political subjectivity, they 
ultimately abdicate from asserting any claim to revolutionary certainty. 
It is near the conclusion of their dialogue that they mark what is 
perhaps their most significant divergence from Marx and Engels, 
writing: ‘What we reject is not practice but telling people what to do. 
Because we are still permitted to live, we are under an obligation to do 
something’ (Adorno & Horkheimer 2011, p. 109). Here, Adorno and 
Horkheimer establish a political ground from which to theorize the 
manifesto genre in opposition to a political program. This is to say, it is 
a manifesto exclusive of command that Adorno and Horkheimer 
gesture toward in the quotation above, and a way of theorizing a 
politics of resistance that encourages action without authoritarian 
impulses. 
The associated political problems of theorizing a programless 
manifesto are provocative—what is a manifesto if not a political 
program? Further, what does a radical politics look like absent of a 
center of command? Here, I think that what might be interpreted as 
uncertainty or ambivalence toward revolutionary praxis might be 
better framed as a concern that presages what Michel Foucault would 
pose as a question in his preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-
Oedipus: ‘How does one keep from being a fascist, even (especially) 
when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant’ (Foucault 
1985, p. xiii)? This is to say, I think the formation and expression of a 
programless manifesto is not to argue for a formless and directionless 
politics. What is at stake in the movement to create the conditions for 
a manifesto against a political program is the desire to organize a 
revolutionary force without representing a revolutionary future in the 
form of a totality, and further, without internalizing and redeploying an 
uncompromising position of command. Reluctant to tell revolutionaries 
what the future of resistance should look like or how we should get 
there, Adorno and Horkheimer fundamentally shift the terms of 
political action and thought. It is, against Lyon and Puchner’s 
theorization of the genre, a move to call forth and represent a radical 
politics without its collapse into a political doctrine or a battle of –isms.  
So the question of fomenting a new, radical politics absent of a 
political program approached by Adorno and Horkheimer has a two-
pronged effect. On the one hand, their project comes to bear on the 
organization of a radical politics and a radical movement. On the other 
hand, Adorno and Horkheimer’s project, where it is certainly the result 
of an era of nationalized fascisms and genocide, also signals a 
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profound shift in the operation of sovereign power on a transnational 
scale. One key insight with reference to the dialogue is the question of 
America—whether it is a truly democratic enterprise and therefore a 
political model to affirm or if the seat of fascism has merely relocated 
itself across the Atlantic2. We can take another cue from twentieth and 
twenty-first century Continental thought. Post-WWII, fascism hasn’t 
been eliminated and it hasn’t disappeared, rather it takes on new 
forms with various names, something like micro-fascisms, societies of 
control and technologies of securitization, or the interplay of molar and 
molecular milieus.  
What Adorno and Horkheimer’s dialogue signals is thus a 
contemporary problem. How should resistance be organized and 
expressed in the face of a shifting globalized political terrain? Hardt 
and Negri intervene precisely at this juncture, offering both an 
alternative ground from which to theorize the manifesto genre and an 
alternative analytic of resistance. In their coauthored Empire, the first 
of the three part Empire series, Hardt and Negri write of the manifesto 
genre, some 50 years or so after Adorno and Horkheimer’s dialogue, 
that: 
Today a manifesto, a political discourse, should aspire to fulfill a 
Spinozist prophetic function, the function of an immanent desire 
that organizes the multitude. There is not finally here any 
determinism or utopia: this is rather a radical counterpower, 
ontologically grounded not on any ‘vide pour le futur’ but on the 
actual activity of the multitude, its creation, production, and 
power—a materialist teleology. (Hardt & Negri 2001, p. 66) 
Interestingly, a debate ensued on Empire’s status as a new 
communist manifesto immediately following its publication. Perhaps 
best identified in Slavoj Zizek’s ‘Have Hardt and Negri Written The 
Communist Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century?’ Empire is 
asserted to be both an exercise in rethinking and rewriting the 
possible use and function of the genre and a text that is able to 
‘describe globalization as an ambiguous “deterritorialization”’ (Zizek 
2001, p. 192). In a manner that extends beyond Marx and Engels’ 
Communist Manifesto, Empire analyzes how ‘victorious global 
capitalism pushes into every pore of our social lives, into the most 
intimate of spheres, and installs an ever present dynamic, which no 
longer is based on patriarchal or other hierarchic structures of 
dominance’ (Zizek 2001, p. 192). Zizek is right to pose the project of 
the manifesto as a question in reference to Empire. With Hardt and 
Negri’s comments above, they seem to refuse the formal political 
imperatives of traditional manifestos. In their newly coauthored 
pamphlet, Declaration, Hardt and Negri say as much, claiming that: 
Manifestos provide a glimpse of a world to come and also call into 
being the subject, who although now only a specter must 
materialize to become the agent of change. Manifestos work like 
the ancient prophets, who by the power of their vision create their 
own people. Today's social movements have reversed the order, 
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making manifestos and prophets obsolete. (Hardt & Negri 2012, p. 
1) 
A blunt but nonetheless interesting claim, Hardt and Negri’s 
comments here are a theoretical continuation of Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s project and a departure from it. For, given both claims 
about the manifesto, it is questionable as to whether Hardt and Negri 
are declaring the death of a genre or if they are declaring the death of 
a particular form of theorizing and organizing radical politics. What is 
clear is that the manifesto genre is in question and in transformation, 
and it is of particular socio-political conditions that its continued 
efficacy and transformation is produced. 
Without getting too caught up in its alleged formation and operation, 
the multitude, Hardt and Negri’s figure of revolutionary production and 
expression, finds its basis in three universal political platforms that 
command resistance and its futural interventions. To cite from 
Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri write: 
A first platform must demand the support of life against misery, that 
is, simply, that governments must provide everyone with the basic 
means of life . . . a second platform must demand equality against 
hierarchy, allowing everyone to be capable of participating in the 
constitution of society; collective self-rule, and constructive 
interaction with others . . . a third platform must demand open 
access to the common against the barriers of private property. 
(Hardt & Negri 2011, pp. 380-1) 
Given these three platforms, the multitude is theorized as an absolute 
democratic horizon proper to contemporary forms of resistance, anti-
capitalist or otherwise. Insofar as the multitude is produced as a 
resistant force to state power and capitalist sovereignty, it finds its 
basis in the elimination of misery, equality against hierarchy, and 
access to the common in every instance. The democratic future 
produced if the multitude is actualized is thus conditioned by these 
three platforms. It is important to note that, with a slight twist, these 
platforms are articulated differently in Empire, focused more on 
demands for global citizenship and creativity3. What this position 
allows Hardt and Negri, however, is a means to reformulate and 
redefine the focus and intent of revolutionary violence. As resistance 
is exercised by the multitude, any compulsion or implementation of 
violent tactics is reconfigured and made subject to its democratic 
principles. Guided by Hardt and Negri’s platforms, the organization of 
the multitude is somehow able to debate, avow, and even 
reconceptualize the focus and intent of resistance, as it moves to rend 
any democratic use of violence from producing destruction on an 
excessive or mass scale. The violence of the multitude thus somehow 
reduces destruction to a minimum as it is guided by democratic 
principles of self-governance. Two arguments in Multitude: War and 
Democracy in the Age of Empire are indicative of this process. Here, 
Hardt and Negri assert that: 
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The third principle of the democratic use of violence has to do with 
democratic organization itself. If according to the first principle the 
use of violence is always subordinated to political process and 
decision, and if that political process is democratic, organized in the 
horizontal, common formation of the multitude, then the use of 
violence too must be organized democratically. Wars waged by 
sovereign powers have always required the suspension of 
freedoms and democracy. The organized violence of its military 
requires strict, unquestioned authority. The democratic use of 
violence must be entirely different. There can be no separation 
between means and ends. (Hardt & Negri 2004, p. 345) 
Here, the primary difference between the multitude’s use of violence 
and that of non-democratic entities is as much one of organization as 
it is one of compulsion. Let me clarify by saying that Hardt and Negri 
do give lip service to a democratic, horizontal, common formation of 
the multitude as they subsequently assert a new, democratic form of 
violence as a result of its organization. How the violence of the 
multitude is organized and what this new form of democratic violence 
might be remains absent from any substantive theorization of armed 
struggle. Here, Hardt and Negri simply conclude this discussion by 
claiming: ‘We need to create weapons that are not merely destructive 
but are themselves forms of constituent power, weapons capable of 
constructing democracy and defeating the armies of Empire’ (Hardt & 
Negri 2005, p. 347). I take this claim to directly correspond to the idea 
that democratic violence is efficient and minimized as there is no 
separation between means and ends.  
What, then, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has changed? 
What allows for, but also, what creates the need for revolutionary 
expression and the manifesto, a privileged mode of its articulation, to 
be called into question and to potentially transform? A slow 
transformation in the operation of sovereign power across and beyond 
the territory of the nation state—what Hardt and Negri call capitalist 
sovereignty and what they call Empire—works to produce the 
conditions for alternative forms of resistance. It is what Foucault terms 
governmentality, or a spatial division of technologies of security 
simultaneous with the capitalization of a territory absent of a center 
and an outside4. To put it another way, there is a novelty in the 
condition from which sovereign power no longer functions as a 
centrifugal force within a given territory, but a centripetal one over and 
beyond the territory: it becomes an apparatus of administration rather 
than a mere lord of the law. Hardt and Negri’s claim is that it is a 
spatial reconfiguration of power from the sovereign nation-state to the 
transnational administration of life that works hand in hand to produce 
the conditions for a reconfiguration of an entire genre of resistance.  
Two points are of note, then, both in reference to the immanent desire 
that organizes the multitude and its actual activity. At least with 
reference to the manifesto, I think Hardt and Negri are correct in 
Empire to focus on its revolutionary effect, or perhaps power, as a 
turn toward the virtual—as having the potential to radically redistribute 
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the focus and location of revolutionary intent. Indeed, I think their 
claim in Declaration underscores this idea, albeit through the declared 
end of the genre. With such a radical revisioning of the relation 
between sovereign power and resistance, the question of whether or 
not the written expression of a new politics of resistance can still be 
called a manifesto is critical. Where the expression of a radical politics 
is not a question of telling anyone what to do, not a question of 
determinism or utopia, but an immanent desire toward the spatio-
temporal reconfiguration of the present, the potential in and of its 
actual activity is simultaneously aggregated and dispersed. The 
political work of the manifesto in this context is focused in the present 
and in one’s present company—on the actual activity of those who 
resist state power and capitalist sovereignty—without asserting the 
need for the unity of a political program or calling forth a unitary 
political subjectivity.  
I think the work to theorize the place and function of the manifesto 
genre in contemporary politics is precisely the kind of weapon that 
Hardt and Negri imagine in their political odyssey. To theorize and to 
write a manifesto without determinism or utopia but with the 
compulsion to act is precisely a way to reschematize political fields, to 
change the formal structure of an entire genre of resistance, and to 
focus on manifesting alternative spaces and times of resistance, 
adapted to a shifting, globalized political terrain. Empire itself is a kind 
of quasi-manifesto that calls forth a new set of rules and pushes the 
boundaries of what the manifesto can do. Indeed, where a 
theorization of the genre more generally calls for an end of ancient 
prophets manifesting a political program and revolutionary 
subjectivity, political expression is no longer for the project of 
producing a manual authorizing and determining revolutionary action, 
it produces a novel ‘incorporeal transformation.’ Here, the genre 
comes to function as a virtual topography, or landscape that outlines 
and distributes possible avenues for resistance. A manifesto in this 
context, if it is to persist, would become a far more ephemeral and 
situational genre; it would function as a site of spatio-temporal 
reconfiguration, but only insofar as its political orientation continues to 
resonate with the direction of resistance. 
Mapping the Virtual, Re-Theorizing Resistance 
On this point, I propose to address the problems of political orientation 
a step or two beyond the claim that the contemporary organization 
and expression of resistance is not about telling people what to do. 
With such a radical shift in thinking the organization and force of 
resistance to state power and capitalist sovereignty, alternative 
models for resistance are demanded. So, if the shift in the 
organization and operation of resistance and, indeed, a primary genre 
through which resistance is articulated, can no longer be expressed 
with a manual-like function, what does a turn toward the virtual 
actually produce? If the manifesto is to be theorized as a virtual 
landscape of possible interaction for resistance rather than a 
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prophetic vision, how does it work? With Adorno, Horkheimer, Hardt, 
and Negri calling the manifesto’s formal structure and political impact 
into question, theorizing the manifesto today necessitates uncovering 
what models of representation are available for expressing a radical 
politics in the twenty-first century as much as it necessitates 
considering the way it schematizes political fields. However, contra 
Hardt and Negri’s project in the Empire series, disassociating the 
manifesto from its structure of command is much less about inventing 
a new revolutionary figure than it is about actualizing alternative times 
and places for resistance to manifest. Indeed, new revolutionary 
figures like the multitude or the 99% are common and do not seem to 
produce or display the revolutionary characteristics attributed to them. 
Certainly, this is where Hardt and Negri’s theorization of the genre 
and call for its end requires further clarification; precisely how does 
the manifesto, reformulated as a radical counterpower, either fail or 
work to produce a multiplicity of times and spaces for resistance? 
Theorizing a programless manifesto, despite the political ends that 
either Adorno and Horkheimer or Hardt and Negri claim, is primarily a 
political and philosophical question of representation. It poses the 
problem of claiming that radical alternatives to the present actually 
exist without producing them as a totality. Indeed, positing a 
programless manifesto creates the problem of claiming that there is a 
time and place after the revolution that can be derived from our 
present social and political conditions, without saying what it is. As 
stated above, this problem does not lead to a formless or directionless 
politics, nor does it lead to political quietism. It affirms a vital and 
dynamic potential for revolutionary expression. Here, the manifesto’s 
experimental theorization and possible end signals a shift away from 
Lyon’s arguments on representation, particularly where she claims 
that one of the manifesto’s fundamental characteristics is to 
interpellate a ‘we’ that will demand recognition or struggle to attain it. 
One of Lyon’s most forceful arguments in Manifestoes: Provocations 
of the Modern is that the manifesto’s modes of representation have a 
distinct temporality. In several instances Lyon asserts that the time of 
the manifesto is now, literally, now, constituting the genre as a kind of 
revolutionary axis that ultimately recalibrates linear and progressive 
temporal formations5. Puchner affirms this temporal formulation with a 
slight twist. Where the manifesto calls for revolution now, it speculates 
and establishes possible futures that will have been affirmed at a later 
date: ‘the speech acts of the manifesto are thus launched in the 
anterior future, claiming that their authority will have been provided by 
the changes they themselves want to bring about’ (Puchner 2006, p. 
24). In this way, the future tense is effective only insofar as it 
manifests the temporal conditions of the now. In a second temporal 
figuration, Lyon claims that the manifesto enacts a particular 
spatialization as it spans history; it ‘bridges the different episodes of 
the “permanent revolution” by acting as a kind of radical Esperanto 
across decades and nations and cultures’ (Lyon 1999, p. 60). 
Following this argument, the manifesto formalizes revolutionary 
actions and tactics into distinctive revolutionary episodes where its 
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temporality and capacity for representation traverses history. The ‘we’ 
that is established and represented by the manifesto is at the very 
same time the revolutionary body that propels its temporal 
interventions. 
Perhaps one of the more practical applications of Adorno, 
Horkheimer, Hardt, and Negri’s theorizations of the manifesto genre is 
that they work to displace the subject from a position of being 
represented by text, a political program, or a state, and focus on 
developing a tactics with which to disrupt authoritarian impulses. An 
alternative theorization of the genre and an alternative use demands 
that the manifesto’s modes of representation and spatio-temporal 
interventions be reinvented. A programless manifesto would not posit 
the question, does this manifesto speak for me, does it adequately 
describe my cause and provide a remedy to the problem now? 
Rather, it poses the question, does this manifesto impart a 
composition of techniques for resistance, does it resonate in 
conditions of struggle or does it remain indecipherable?  
In The Logic of Sense, his last major work preceding Anti-Oedipus 
and A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze addresses the political 
concerns at work in a re-theorization of the manifesto as he produces 
an analysis of representation that affirms the virtual, rethinking 
spatialization and underscoring non-linear temporalities. More than 
this, he offers alternative models for representing a radical politics by 
restructuring the ways that representation functions. Here, we could 
say that Deleuze offers a mechanics of what he later terms the 
incorporeal transformation, writing: 
Representation must encompass an expression which it does not 
represent, but without which it itself would not be ‘comprehensive,’ 
and would have truth only by chance or from outside . . . There is a 
‘use’ of representation, without which representation would remain 
lifeless and senseless. Wittgenstein and his disciples are right to 
define meaning by means of use. But such use is not defined 
through a function of representation in relation to the represented, 
nor even through representativeness as the form of possibility. 
Here, as elsewhere, the functional is transcended in the direction of 
a topology, and use is in the relation between representation and 
something extra-representative, a nonrepresented and merely 
expressed entity. Representation envelops the event in another 
nature, it envelops it at its borders, it stretches until this point, and it 
brings about this lining or hem. (Deleuze 1990, p. 146) 
On Deleuze’s account, representation refers to something concrete, 
but also to an alternative temporality and spatialization that cannot be 
reduced to what is represented. In other words, when something is 
posited, like a possible future that stands in opposition to the present, 
its representation is at once defined by its use, or maybe even by its 
intention, but is not equivalent to a programmatic determination of the 
future. Representation refuses its capture and its use is located in 
what exceeds the representation itself. So the use of positing an 
alternative future is not in enforcing its realization, making what is real 
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conform to a vision of what it should be, but in locating the tactics and 
techniques through which radical futures take shape in the present.  
Deleuze theorizes representation within a temporal fold, a topological 
figuration of time in which time and space are indiscernible events. 
Within this figuration of time, representation is in a constant state of 
flux, changing and overlapping as it is put into use. So given this 
spatio-temporalization of representation, it cannot be reduced to its 
prophecy—to a progressive linearity or a moment in which the future 
is programmatically determined. To quote Deleuze: ‘this is the use of 
representation: the mime, and no longer the fortune teller. One stops 
going from the greatest present toward a future and past which are 
said only of a smaller present; on the contrary, one goes from the 
future and past as unlimited, all the way to the smallest present of a 
pure instant which is endlessly subdivided’ (Deleuze 1990, p. 147). 
On this point, Deleuze marks a crucial difference where he considers 
the temporal figure of the present. Where the now refers to the 
moment in which history is and can redetermine its path or line, he 
turns to the instant, a temporal frontier in which multiple environs 
come to be articulated as coconstitutive zones of relation, without 
linear progression. In Deleuze’s words, where the instant stands 
opposed to the now, ‘it is no longer the future and past which subvert 
the existing present; it is the instant which perverts the present into 
inhering future and past’ (Deleuze 1990, p. 165). Here, representation 
becomes a form of expression actualized by the instant; it becomes a 
question of how a multiplicity of times and spaces are harnessed, but 
also how a multiplicity of times and spaces exceeds the way its 
relation and movement are rendered.  
Accordingly, what Deleuze’s assertions afford are not merely an 
alternative way of thinking representation, time, and space but an 
alternative way of thinking the effects of the manifesto’s relation to 
history. Certainly, it necessitates a reconsideration of the manifesto’s 
very techniques of expression aligned with the projects outlined above 
by both Lyon and Puchner. For both theorists, the temporal figure of 
the now cites a break and collapse in time. Where the manifesto 
breaks with progressive, hegemonic histories, past, present, and 
future are located at once within the same temporal zone of 
enunciation and implementation: past and future come to be 
concentrated in the present. This is to say, the now of the manifesto is 
supposed to establish a unitary and immediate temporal mode of 
revolutionary action in which the present tense functions as both a 
revelation and a pivot—the now of the manifesto calls an end to the 
current order of history, but also acts as the rotating point at which 
history is re-determined. In so many words, this is how the manifesto 
is thought to enact its prophetic function, the revelatory event that 
redirects a particular milieu toward an alternative future as it assumes 
historical and political certainty. Lyon’s second formulation of the 
manifesto’s temporality establishes a problem of a different order. 
While claiming that the manifesto spreads out across time, linking 
revolutionary acts as they are expressed in and through the genre 
might seem like a temporal mode of expansion, it rather contributes to 
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the concentration of time in the present. The revolutionary now of the 
manifesto comes to function as a kind of spatio-temporal regulation, 
territorializing revolutionary struggle within a unitary temporal mode of 
intervention. Stated another way, the manifestic immediacy of the now 
operates as a kind of territory of time, concentrating revolutionary 
struggle within a single temporal figure. It is precisely here that a 
focus on virtuality becomes necessary for fomenting an alternative 
theorization of the genre. 
If Empire is a text that both theorizes and provokes theorization of the 
manifesto genre’s virtual capacities, Timothy C. May’s 1992 Crypto 
Anarchist Manifesto is an early example of how the genre might 
distribute its virtual, or inherent power, differently. At the forefront of 
the Cyberpunk movement, May authored The Crypto Anarchist 
Manifesto immediately prior to the Internet’s popularization and 
corporatization, identifying its capacities for anti-capitalist and anti-
statist political projects. While what he describes might sound like an 
amalgam of science fiction and misplaced hope in virtual 
technologies, it is, prior to Hardt and Negri’s theorization and call for 
the end of the manifesto genre, a move toward producing an 
alternative political landscape that emphasizes revolutionary 
interaction through anonymity, rather than the manifestation of a 
revolutionary program and subject. Here, May writes:  
A specter is haunting the modern world, the specter of crypto 
anarchy. Computer technology is on the verge of providing the 
ability for individuals and groups to communicate and interact with 
each other in a totally anonymous manner. Two persons may 
exchange messages, conduct business, and negotiate electronic 
contracts without ever knowing the True Name, or legal identity, of 
the other. Interactions over networks will be untraceable, via 
extensive re-routing of encrypted packets and tamper-proof boxes 
which implement cryptographic protocols with nearly perfect 
assurance against any tampering . . . Just as the technology of 
printing altered and reduced the power of medieval guilds and the 
social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods 
fundamentally alter the nature of corporations and of government 
interference in economic transactions. Combined with emerging 
information markets, crypto anarchy will create a liquid market for 
any and all material which can be put into words and pictures. (May 
1992) 
While May maintains the language of The Communist Manifesto, 
anticipating an imminent futural state in which revolutionary capacities 
will be realized, his use of the genre ultimately alters its form and 
function. First, it does not command a subject or a revolutionary 
strategy; it names a practice of resistance and speculates on its 
possible uses. The manifesto is, in this instance, a tool with which to 
liquefy the market and refuse the operation of government: to live and 
to act against and beyond corporate and sovereign capture. A primary 
benefit of computer technology cited in this manifesto is the 
proliferation of and interaction through anonymity. A revolutionary 
body or subject is not called forth; it is formed, maintained, and 
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dispersed in erasure. In turn, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto 
manifests a second virtual function where May mobilizes the genre in 
tandem with computer technology to create a multiplicity of places and 
times of resistance. Here, computer technology is thought as a virtual 
plane from which anonymous interaction is constitutive of relations 
that might alter the ways in which power functions at every level: 
social, political, and economic, across the globe. Indeed, where new 
technological landscapes are developed transnationally, the potential 
for resistance to manifest is simultaneously localized and dispersed, 
happening here and now but also there, then, and to come. In this 
way, the virtual or inherent power of the manifesto genre and 
computer technology do not stand opposed—one does not work to 
eliminate the other—rather, the manifesto becomes a means of 
expressing and schematizing a new way of organizing resistance, 
spatially, temporally, and relationally.  
Through a kind of theoretical melding of computer technologies and 
the manifesto genre, what is produced by The Crypto Anarchist 
Manifesto is neither a program nor a multitude, but a field and a 
practice from which resistance might spring. Stated another way, The 
Crypto Anarchist Manifesto names the manifesto’s potential meta-
function, that of outlining a practice through which incorporeal 
transformations might manifest. In this way, The Crypto Anarchist 
Manifesto is a sketch toward actualizing the manifesto’s topographic 
function as it resists the programmatic determination of its use. It 
maps out potential political positions that would modify as they 
manifest and are put into practice. Certainly, what May calls 
cryptography is precisely the networked interaction of an anonymous 
force, following a multiplicity of paths toward total resistance. Insofar 
as the manifesto is coterminous with, or perhaps a provocation toward 
a radical politics without determinism or utopia, it functions here as a 
tool by which revolutionary tactics are learned, modified, or rejected in 
continuous adaptation and re-enactment.  
Beyond Bipartisan Politics 
As the manifesto’s relation to representation shifts, Lyon’s language of 
command and Puchner’s revolutionary historiography dictated by the 
manifesto no longer makes sense. Neither do their political 
categories. If the manifesto’s virtual capacities are championed, its 
spatio-temporal interventions are no longer predicated on the 
movement of one –ism triumphing over another, moving toward a 
revolutionary future. Deleuze’s analysis of representation, space, and 
time above refuses these modes of sublation and replaces them with 
a threshold for disjunction. As a form of expression actualized in the 
instant representation allows for total opposition and difference to 
proliferate rather than political unification in a doctrine, an –ism, or 
even a program to dominate thought and action. A politics of the 
genre in opposition and irreducible to a political program thus 
necessitates theorizing how the manifesto creates opportunities for 
living a radical politics, rather than how it institutes a framework 
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wherein it would establish and subsequently dictate a revolutionary 
historiography. This position necessitates something more than 
theorizing new models of representation for expressing a radical 
politics; it necessitates a reconfiguration of its political relations. 
Indeed, it requires rethinking the processes through which the 
manifesto participates in schematizing political fields and orienting 
political action. Therefore, even with a theorization of the genre 
opposed to Lyon and Puchner, the problem of partisanship hinted at 
in the introduction doesn’t disappear, it is all the more an imminent 
concern. 
While Adorno and Horkheimer don’t pursue the question of a new 
manifesto far enough to consider a reinvention of partisan relations, 
Hardt and Negri seem to overcompensate for this absence, insisting 
on the invention of the multitude and asserting its novel capabilities for 
resistance. But if Hardt and Negri are correct to claim that the 
landscape of power and resistance is now both transnational and 
constituted by the actual activities of those who resist state power and 
capitalist sovereignty, resistance operates as a shifting terrain, 
susceptible to constant modification. Under such conditions, partisan 
relations become far more difficult to identify. Where an ‘outside’ of 
power can no longer be assumed, the neat existential division and 
opposition between friends and enemies, certainly the very 
categorical determination of either position, is equally difficult to parse. 
Even if one were to concede to Hardt and Negri, claiming the 
manifesto’s obsolescence in favor of a new radical political project, 
partisan relations are not eliminated from the political, they transform.  
It is on this point that Lyon and Puchner’s theorization of the 
manifesto genre display a critical insight into the organization of the 
political as such. It is precisely the manifesto’s polemics concomitant 
with its assumption of revolutionary certainty that determines political 
relations. Where the political is reducible to a set of antagonistic 
forces, the path toward a revolutionary future is clear: compete with 
the enemy and to the victor goes the spoils. Chantal Mouffe parses 
out the stakes of this framework in a similar language to Lyon and 
Puchner above, stating: 
In the domain of collective identifications, where what is in question 
is the creation of a ‘we’ by the delimitation of a ‘them’, the 
possibility always exists that this we/them relation will turn into a 
relation of the friend/enemy type; in other words it can always 
become political in [Carl] Schmitt’s understanding of the term. This 
can happen when the other, who was until then considered only 
under the mode of difference, begins to be perceived as negating 
our identity, as putting in question our very existence. From that 
moment onwards, any type of we/them relation, be it religious, 
ethnic, national, economic or other, becomes the site of a political 
antagonism. (Mouffe 2006, pp. 2-3) 
What Mouffe’s argument draws out is that the modes of 
representation that both Lyon and Puchner attribute to the manifesto 
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always seem to result in the same fundamental political relation. If the 
manifesto remains a process of command, supersession, and a battle 
of –isms, then it will continually reproduce the same political 
antagonisms. Carl Schmitt provides a particularly problematic, yet 
concise understanding of how the friend/enemy relation operates in 
The Concept of the Political, one that is attributable to Lyon and 
Puchner’s theorization of the manifesto genre. Here, Schmitt writes, 
‘the distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of 
intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation,’ 
yet, the enemy ‘is nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is 
sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, 
existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case 
conflicts with him are possible’ (Schmitt 2007, pp. 26-7). Where 
Schmitt imagines political relations to exist in and between nations, or 
perhaps better described as nationally unified partisan bodies, the 
logical structure of the friend/enemy split is what Lyon and Puchner 
affirm as the manifesto maps a socio-political field and directs its 
composition. Both Lyon’s analysis of representation and Puchner’s 
claim to a revolutionary historiography dictated by the manifesto fall 
squarely within a Schmittian definition of the political and describe 
political relations as an expression of state power or homologous to 
state power. While this does make political concepts and political 
relations clear, it does not rethink the manifesto’s spatio-temporal 
interventions. Indeed, it affirms Hardt and Negri’s condemning 
remarks about the genre. 
Perhaps the most provocative claim in Hardt and Negri’s Empire 
series is that power over life, indeed, production itself, constitutes a 
partisan relation that might be aligned with an entirely different set of 
social and political relations. This is to say, what is necessary for the 
multitude to function as a radical counterpower is the production of an 
alternative political relation, reschematizing political fields, and 
affirming the power of bodies in struggle. Straight and to the point, 
Hardt and Negri claim that ‘all notions that pose the power of 
resistance as homologous or even similar to the power that oppresses 
us are of no more use’ (Hardt & Negri 2005, p. 90). It is here that the 
focus on production takes precedent over all other political forms and 
tactics in the name of the multitude. If resistance cannot be conceived 
in a homologous relation to state power and capitalist sovereignty, it 
must actively exceed it, breaking from a cycle in which those who 
resist simply react to Empire with an equal or corresponding relation 
in structure and origin. Here, Hardt and Negri write, ‘biopolitics is a 
partisan relationship between subjectivity and history that is crafted by 
a multitudinous strategy, formed by events and resistances, and 
articulated by a discourse that links political decision making to the 
construction of bodies in struggle’ (Hardt & Negri 2011, p. 61). A 
positive biopolitical project, or a positive form of production and 
administration over life, is what actualizes the multitude and a new set 
of partisan relations; it is what unites Hardt and Negri’s democratic 
principles of violence with the organization of the multitude as well as 
what allows for the emergence of alternative times and spaces for 
resistance. 
border lands 11:3  
 
 
19 
 
 
 
In its own quasi-political pamphlet and manifesto, This is Not a 
Program, anarcho-communist collective Tiqqun is quick to criticize 
Hardt and Negri on these points, claiming that Negri in particular fails 
to rid the concepts of Empire and the multitude of authoritarian 
compulsions: 
The three watchwords typical of political Negrism–for all its strength 
lies in its ability to provide informal neo-militants with issues on 
which to focus their demands–are the ‘citizens dividend,’ the right 
to free movement (‘Papers for everyone!’), and the right to 
creativity, especially if computer-assisted. In this sense, the Negrist 
perspective is in no way different from the imperial perspective but 
rather a mere instance of perfectionism within it . . . Hence political 
Negrism’s incestuous relationship with imperial pacification: it 
wants reality but not its realism. It wants Biopolitics without police, 
communication without Spectacle, peace without having to wage 
war to get it. Strictly speaking, Negrism does not coincide with 
imperial thought; it is simply the idealist face of political thought. 
(Tiqqun 2011, pp. 117-18) 
Here, the focus of the collective’s criticism lies in the idea that the 
transnational administration of life, across and beyond territorial 
boundaries, can be democratically controlled. Where Hardt and Negri 
insist on the inherent democratic authority of the multitude, they belie 
their revolutionary project. To use a similar language at work in their 
theorization of the manifesto, the multitude is a showcase of both 
determinism and utopia, grounded in an idealized vision of future. 
Tiqqun does however maintain Hardt and Negri’s claim that 
homologous relations to state power and capitalist sovereignty are 
inadequate, refocusing their attention on a reinvention of partisan 
relations. 
In the opening essay of its This is Not a Program, Tiqqun asserts the 
need for a redefinition of social and political antagonism, framing the 
redefinition of the political as a question of organizing life: ‘A 
redefinition of historical conflict is needed, not intellectually: vitally’ 
(Tiqqun 2011, p. 12). This is to say, the political is, for Tiqqun, not a 
question of asserting new, or rehabilitating what they consider to be 
antiquated, epistemological categories through which to organize and 
define antagonism and conflict, it is rather the organization of a 
concept of partisanship that finds its constitution in forms of life that 
exceed, oppose, and redistribute a revolutionary telos. Indeed, the 
question of a revolutionary telos is challenged and rejected in their 
redefinition of the political as Tiqqun works toward thinking and living 
out reengineered modes of antagonism, conflict, and resistance. Most 
importantly class, stemming from a Marxist figuration of social and 
political antagonism wherein two unified forces come to oppose each 
other in a battle for supersession and hegemony, is the limit to which 
the political is constrained prior to and within the present moment. 
Here, Tiqqun writes: 
Historical conflict no longer opposes two massive molar heaps, two 
classes—the exploited and the exploiters, the dominant and the 
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dominated, managers and workers—among which, in each 
individual case, one could differentiate. The front line no longer cuts 
through the middle of society; it now runs through the middle of 
each of us, between what makes us a citizen, our predicates, and 
all the rest. It is thus in each of us that war is being waged between 
imperial socialization and that which already eludes it. A 
revolutionary process can be set in motion from any point of the 
biopolitical fabric, from any singular situation, by exposing, even 
breaking, the line of flight that traverses it. (Tiqqun 2011, p. 12) 
Resistance, and hence any partisan formations that result, then, is 
conceived of as a practice of life, as an aesthetic, or as a kind of 
distribution of the sensible. A vital form of partisanship rests on the 
creation of a form of life that is, at its most basic levels of production, 
that which opposes and that which exceeds the governing power of 
‘biopolitical democracies.’ In this way, Tiqqun names a practice of 
resistance without simultaneously calling forth a revolutionary subject. 
In a manner similar to that of The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, a virtual 
plane of interaction is theorized, and it is this plane of interaction itself 
that replaces the formation of revolutionary subjects in homologous 
opposition to powers of oppression. Here, Tiqqun also insists on 
revolutionary anonymity rather than the formation of a figure or a 
subject. The ‘Imaginary Party’ is offered as an alternative to bipartisan 
struggle, relying on a categorically different mode of the organization 
of life: ‘building the Party means establishing forms-of-life in their 
difference, intensifying, complicating relations between them, 
developing as subtly as possible civil war between us’ (Tiqqun 2011, 
p. 13). This alternative relies not on a comprehension of or 
epistemological command over the relations that give rise to social 
and political antagonism, but on the circulation of encounters that 
‘further the process of ethical polarization,’ thus creating the possibility 
for alternative, resistant forms of life (Tiqqun 2011, p. 14). 
The title of Tiqqun’s quasi pamphlet and manifesto thus strikes at the 
heart of the problematics and possibilities of theorizing the genre as a 
provocation toward actualizing a fundamental shift in the operation 
and organization of radical politics: This is Not a Program. As a 
slogan, this seems to sum up Adorno and Horkheimer’s position while 
refusing to let Hardt and Negri monopolize claims toward the possible 
reinvention or total extinction of the manifesto genre. Indeed, ‘this is 
not a program’ is perhaps the slogan of the manifesto’s own 
incorporeal transformation. As programmatic politics are refused, a 
complex landscape of revolutionary tactics and expression emerge. 
Further, with a reinvention of partisan relations, the means by which a 
radical politics is practiced shifts. Defying a homologous or bipartisan 
struggle at the heart of the political begins to reshape the language 
and expression of resistance: resistance becomes the proliferation of 
multiple times and spaces where anti-capitalist and anti-statist forms 
of life are lived. Stated another way, the virtual becomes the real. 
Consequently, what the contemporary focus on the manifesto genre’s 
future, or lack thereof, signifies is a profound desire to reengineer 
radical politics from the top down. It is an attempt to reimagine the 
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possibilities inherent to a primary genre of revolutionary expression 
and a fundamental step toward theorizing and living a radical politics 
in the present. 
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Notes 
1 Klein’s precise claim here is that ‘Thanks to the Net, mobilizations are able 
to unfold with sparse bureaucracy and minimal hierarchy; forced consensus 
and labored manifestos are fading into the background, replaced instead by 
a culture of constant, loosely structured, and sometimes compulsive 
information-swapping’ (Klein 2002, p. 267). A condition like this is only 
compounded in the contemporary moment with technologies like Facebook, 
Twitter, etc.  
2 In the section of Towards a New Manifesto titled ‘Political Concreteness,’ 
Adorno and Horkheimer wrestle with the concern for being too abstract in 
their theorization of a new manifesto, but also being too concrete. Indeed, an 
argument ensues concerning the idea of drawing a concrete utopic vision 
into the project of theorizing a new manifesto along with a set of guiding 
political principles. It is here that certain achievements in America are 
championed, ‘the reliability of the legal system, drugstores, etcetera’ (Adorno 
& Horkheimer 2011, p. 63). Adorno and Horkheimer ultimately conclude the 
argument by saying that they ‘must somehow manage to suggest things 
rather than say them directly’ (Adorno & Horkheimer 2011, p. 64). 
3 In Empire, Hardt and Negri focus seven, rather than three demands of the 
multitude. All oriented toward a democratic transnationalism, these seven 
demands cohere with Hardt and Negri’s three democratic principles of the 
multitude but display a broader spectrum of possibilities within its production 
and eventual fruition.  
4 Foucault draws this argument out in detail throughout Security, Territory, 
Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978.  
5 A substance discussion of this problem can be found throughout the first 
chapter of Lyon’s Manifestoes: Provocations of the Modern. 
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